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SYNOPSIS
Reviews of state public health preparedness improvements have been primar-
ily limited to measuring funds expenditures and achievement of cooperative 
agreement benchmarks. Such reviews fail to assess states’ actual capacity for 
meeting the challenges they may face during an emergency, as evidenced by 
activities undertaken during the various phases of a disaster. This article exam-
ines North Carolina’s public health preparedness and response performance 
during two hurricanes, Hurricane Floyd in 1999 and Hurricane Isabel in 2003, 
as well as capacity building activities in the intervening years. North Carolina 
created new infrastructures, enhanced laboratory capacity, and strengthened 
communications after Hurricane Floyd. These activities facilitated implementa-
tion of functional capabilities through effective centralized communication, 
command and control incident management, and a rapid needs assessment 
and medical surveillance during Hurricane Isabel. North Carolina continues 
to implement these capabilities in public health emergencies. Measuring and 
implementing functional capabilities during exercises or real events facilitates 
achievement of preparedness performance standards, goals, and objectives.
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Since 1999, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) has provided $4,575 million to state and local 
agencies to improve public health preparedness.1 
This funding, as well as funding through the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), is 
designed to improve public health infrastructure to 
respond to bioterrorism events, infectious disease 
outbreaks, and other public health emergencies.2 
Several recent studies3–6 have examined the impact of 
the federal investment on preparedness infrastructure 
improvements.
The Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials surveyed its membership in early 2003 to 
determine state progress toward achieving the CDC 
and HRSA preparedness cooperative agreement 
requirements.3 Survey results indicated that states 
had achieved a variety of short-term goals and activi-
ties including hiring staff, developing preparedness 
plans and protocols, and creating new organizational 
infrastructures.3
The U.S. Government Accounting Office reviewed 
state cooperative agreement progress reports for 
CDC and HRSA preparedness programs to determine 
the extent to which states had completed program 
requirements within the first year of funding.4 States 
had made improvements in aspects of preparedness 
including disease surveillance systems, laboratory 
capacity, communications, workforce, surge capacity, 
regional coordination, and capacity to use the Strategic 
National Stockpile, but no state had completely met 
all preparedness requirements.4
The Trust for America’s Health examined states’ per-
formance in 10 public health emergency preparedness 
capabilities in 2003 and 2004.5,6 These capabilities are 
organized into funding, fundamental components of a 
comprehensive public health system, and “all hazards” 
categories, which reflect the impact of preparedness 
efforts on traditional public health functions. While 
the state preparedness scores improved from 2003 to 
2004, states were struggling to meet basic preparedness 
requirements and did not have adequate resources to 
meet competing public health priorities.5,6
The above studies are limited to examining expen-
ditures and achievement of cooperative agreement 
requirements or other check-off benchmarks such as 
the presence of a pandemic flu plan. This focus reflects 
the initial CDC supplemental grant guidance, which 
concentrated on building capacity and establishing 
preparedness infrastructures. Asch et al. identified 
and evaluated 27 instruments for planning or evalu-
ating public health preparedness using the Essential 
Public Health Services framework.7 The instruments 
reviewed, including the Public Health Performance 
Standards, provided no clear definition of prepared-
ness or ways it should be measured, relied on subjective 
or structural measures, and did not measure agency 
accountability.7
Furthermore, existing public health preparedness 
studies do not include measures from disaster manage-
ment8 or public health disaster9,10 literature. This litera-
ture examines disaster response, including bioterrorism 
events, in phases and defines public health responsibili-
ties and functions for these phases. Noji identified five 
phases of a disaster and outlined activities that public 
health agencies should conduct to meet the needs of 
a community.9 Learning from Experience  presents a logic 
model for public health preparedness capabilities.11 In 
this model, agencies conduct capacity-building activi-
ties to prepare for an effective response and perform 
functional capabilities during emergency response. 
Preparedness objectives are early outbreak detection, 
effective response and recovery, and return to normal 
functioning; preparedness goals are to mitigate morbid-
ity and mortality, stress, and social consequences. For 
states to achieve public health preparedness objectives 
and goals, they must be able to conduct all components 
of response through implementing capacity-building 
activities and functional capabilities.11
This article examines North Carolina’s public health 
preparedness and response performance improve-
ments in capacity-building activities and functional 
capabilities between two hurricanes, Hurricane Floyd 
in 1999 and Hurricane Isabel in 2003. Many of the 
response requirements for hurricanes are similar to 
those of bioterrorism or other emergency events, and 
require implementation of all the major components 
of public health emergency response.11 Thus, we were 
presented with a natural experiment through which we 
could compare the level of preparedness and response 
to major hurricanes as indicative of the impact of major 
investments in North Carolina emergency prepared-
ness. The full report of this study is available online at 
http://www.sph.unc.edu/nccphp/hurricane.pdf.
Event chronology
In 1999, North Carolina experienced catastrophic 
flooding as part of the aftermath of Hurricane Floyd, 
a Category II hurricane. Rainfall amounts of 15 to 20 
inches were reported, surpassing historical records for 
flooding in the state. Storm surges reached 9 to 10 feet, 
and several tornadoes were reported in eastern North 
Carolina.12 Fifty-seven deaths were directly attributed 
to Floyd, with 35 of these deaths occurring in North 
Carolina. By March 2000, the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA) had reported $1.08 billion 
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in claims from North Carolina. Moreover, FEMA des-
ignated 66 counties and their residents as eligible to 
apply for disaster assistance.13
In 2003, another Category II storm, Hurricane Isa-
bel, caused considerable wind damage to a number 
of North Carolina communities. Sustained winds of 
64 to 84 knots were reported. Storm surges of six to 
eight feet were reported along the Atlantic coast, with 
a maximum surge of 10.5 feet reported on the Neuse 
River. Rainfall amounts averaged four to seven inches 
in eastern North Carolina.14 Isabel was directly respon-
sible for 16 deaths, including one in North Carolina.14 
In December 2003, FEMA reported $155.2 million in 
claims for assistance in North Carolina. FEMA desig-
nated 47 counties and their residents as eligible to 
apply for disaster assistance.15
METHODS
The North Carolina Division of Public Health (DPH) 
partnered with the North Carolina Center for Public 
Health Preparedness (NCCPHP) to conduct this study. 
NCCPHP is one of 52 preparedness centers in the 
country and is a program of the North Carolina Insti-
tute for Public Health, the service and outreach arm 
of the University of North Carolina, School of Public 
Health (UNC SPH).
The purposes of this study were to compare North 
Carolina’s public health preparation, planning, and 
response between Hurricanes Floyd and Isabel, analyze 
the benefits of federal supplemental funding in inter-
vening years, and assess improvements in public health 
capacity and functional capabilities to respond to two 
hurricanes. To capitalize on the natural experiment, 
we conducted two case studies with embedded units. 
Each hurricane event was a case study, and the separate 
phases of planning, preparing, and responding to the 
hurricane event were the embedded units.16
For the purposes of this study, we adapted Noji’s9 
disaster phases framework into planning, preparation, 
and response phases. Definitions of the phases used in 
this study and those developed by Noji can be found 
in Figure 1. The planning phase includes creating 
infrastructure, policies, and protocols; developing and 
managing relationships across agencies; training staff; 
and conducting drills and exercises. The preparing 
phase includes activities an agency undertakes when 
an event is expected, such as deploying personnel, 
implementing protocols, and communicating with 
other agencies and community members. Finally, the 
response phase includes activities related to imple-
menting functional capabilities, such as conducting 
surveillance and assessment, coordinating the response 
through command and control incident management, 
and communicating with agencies and the public.
We examined DPH performance of public health 
emergency operations within the three phases of the 
disasters. These operations are specified as surveillance, 
Figure 1. Definitions of disaster phases and public health activities
The Disaster Cyclea NC Capacity Evaluation Disaster Phases
Interdisaster Phase—Activities to be taken long before a disaster 
occurs
—Identifying hazards in the community, inventory of resources, 
implementation of preparedness and mitigation measures, and 
educating and training health professionals and the community.
Predisaster or Warning Phase—Protective activities for a known, 
imminent disaster, including implementing protective measures 
and possible evacuation. 
 
Impact Phase—Actual impact of disaster on human health affected 
by factors such as time, intensity, nature of the disaster, population 
density, and organization of health services.
Emergency Phase—Starts immediately after Impact Phase with a 
focus on saving lives and providing relief and assistance. Activities 
include emergency medical assistance, public health surveillance, 
and restoring transportation and communication networks. 
Reconstruction Phase—Re-establishing pre-disaster levels of 
health services, identifying lessons learned, return to Interdisaster 
Phase.
aNoji EK. The public health consequences of disasters. New York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
Planning—Activities that occur during regular business (when 
no event is expected or occurring) to plan or train for an event, 
including creating infrastructure, developing agency policies 
and procedures, developing and managing relationships across 
agencies, training staff, and conducting drills and exercises.
Preparing—Activities undertaken when an event is expected 
to ready systems and personnel for response; conducting 
inter-agency meetings, creating surveillance systems and 
surveys, activating personnel, opening command centers, and 
communicating with community members.
Described, not measured. 
 
Response Phase—Activities undertaken to meet public health 
needs once an event has occurred, including deploying 
personnel to conduct surveillance and assessments, providing 
surge capacity to shelters, and command, control, and 
communication among personnel and agencies. 
Not measured in this study.
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disease investigation, public information, and com-
mand, control, and communications functional 
capabilities. Evaluation questions for this study are 
presented in Figure 2.
Data collection methods included key informant 
interviews and document reviews. Interview participants 
were chosen because of their roles in planning, prepa-
ration, or response to Hurricanes Floyd and/or Isabel. 
An interview protocol was derived from the evaluation 
questions. Documents were state and federal protocols 
and records from the two hurricanes and general 
state emergency planning documents. The evaluation 
plan and case study protocols were submitted to and 
approved by the UNC SPH Institutional Review Board. 
Interview transcripts and documents were analyzed, 
and the data were used to answer the evaluation ques-
tions within the disaster phases framework.
RESULTS
Interviews and document review
We conducted a total of 32 interviews, 20 with indi-
viduals employed by the following agencies: 10 DPH, 
nine other North Carolina state agencies, one federal 
agency, and interviews with five local health department 
directors, four Public Health Regional Surveillance 
Team members, and three UNC SPH employees. All 
intended interviews occurred as planned. Eighty-nine 
documents, 23 for Hurricane Floyd and 66 for Hur-
ricane Isabel, were documented, catalogued, and 
reviewed, representing nearly all documents requested. 
In some cases, documents for Hurricane Floyd were 
not available.
Hurricane Floyd planning
Prior to Hurricane Floyd, DPH had no specific policies 
for preparing for public health emergencies other than 
responsibilities outlined in the state Emergency Opera-
tions Plan. Although the state health director was a 
member of the State Emergency Response Team, DPH 
did not actively coordinate, plan, or prepare for events 
with the state Emergency Operations Center or Division 
of Emergency Management. The only preparedness 
training conducted was in counties with nuclear power 
plants (as required). DPH conducted no preparedness 
exercises in the year prior to Hurricane Floyd.
Hurricane Floyd preparation and response
Communication. Preparation for the hurricane began 
with internal DPH meetings held 24 hours before land-
fall. DPH issued press releases with advice for citizens 
and communicated with local health departments to 
provide information on requesting assistance.
Figure 2. Questions for the evaluation of  
NC DPH planning, preparation, and response  
to Hurricanes Floyd and Isabel
Planning
1. What policies and procedures were in place for DPH to 
prepare for and respond to a disaster or bioterrorism event?
2. What agreements, policies, and procedures were in place 
for DPH to interface with or act in coordination with North 
Carolina Emergency Operations Center?
3. In the year prior to the event, what training activities did 
the DPH provide to core staff, surge capacity staff, and 
volunteers so that staff and volunteers could implement 
protocols or fulfill roles outlined in protocols?
4. In the year prior to the event, did DPH conduct exercises or 
was there a public health emergency that tested protocols 
and procedures?
Preparing 
1. Within 96, 72, 48, 24, and 12 hours of projected hurricane 
landfall, what types of preparation activities did DPH engage 
in?
2. How did DPH interface with the opening of the North 
Carolina Emergency Operations Center?
3. Did DPH communicate with local health departments, 
potential resources, and affected parties to prepare for 
hurricane response (e.g., local health directors, UNC SPH, 
hospitals)? When did the communications occur?
Responding
1. Within how many hours after hurricane landfall did DPH staff 
begin assessing health and illness effects in affected areas?
2. How well coordinated was the rapid assessment process? 
Did it provide appropriate data to make response decisions 
(where to send resources and what resources to send)?
3. Were state/local/other personnel, surge capacity personnel, 
and volunteers used effectively at the Emergency Operations 
Center and in the field?
4. Did DPH staff use an incident command structure to manage 
response? Was the structure effective?
5. How effectively did DPH staff implement protocols in 
surveillance; disease investigation; public information; and 
command, control, and communication?
6. How well did the Public Health Command Center function? 
Did it operate effectively to organize response and 
communication response needs? To which organizations, 
groups, or agencies?
7. What policies and procedures were created, revised, or need 
revision as a result of the effectiveness of response?
General
1. What capacity improvements did DPH make between the 
hurricanes?
2. What actions does the DPH need to take to further improve 
preparation and response capacity?
3. What lessons learned from DPH planning, preparation, and 
response are relevant to other public health emergencies 
such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
pandemic influenza, etc.?
NC DPH 5 North Carolina Division of Public Health
UNC SPH 5 University of North Carolina School of Public Health
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Command and control. DPH used the existing manage-
ment team structure to organize response activities. 
Within 48 hours of landfall, DPH deployed more 
than 20 professional staff from the environmental 
epidemiology and occupational and environmental 
health units.
In response to the enormous impact of Floyd, 
which affected 66 of North Carolina’s 100 counties, 
DPH changed strategies within the first days of the 
response period. DPH organized the 13 counties most 
affected into seven public health zones. A coordinator 
was assigned to each zone to work directly with local 
health departments to establish plans to address priority 
concerns and acquire assistance. A public health zone 
manager was responsible for coordinating the efforts 
of the zone coordinators with DPH.
Surveillance and assessment. A CDC Epidemic Intelli-
gence Service officer created and implemented hospital 
medical surveillance protocols.17 Initially, public health 
workers were deployed to conduct community health 
assessments in teams. Assessment was later shifted to 
the zone coordinators to identify priority areas of health 
concerns within each county. Zone coordinators con-
ducted health and illness assessments in their assigned 
counties with assistance from faculty and students at 
universities located in the central part of the state.
Despite the lack of infrastructure and systems, DPH 
“got the job done” under extraordinary and long-lasting 
circumstances due to the tireless work of its employees. 
Employee dedication and the creation of an ad hoc 
zone coordinator system facilitated DPH response and 
met the needs of local public health agencies. Two fac-
tors that undermined DPH effectiveness were the lack 
of an underlying preparedness and response structure 
and a faulty emergency management environment. The 
accomplishments were remarkable, but the system and 
infrastructure shortcomings were a hindrance.
Capacity-building activities
Agency partnerships. In 1999, North Carolina received 
a CDC Bioterrorism Planning and Assessment grant, 
continued the work of the Bioterrorism Steering 
Committee (the primary vehicle through which 
North Carolina’s preparedness plan was developed 
and continues to be implemented), and created the 
Bioterrorism Team. This team comprises a broad 
group of stakeholders representing state and local 
agencies, community-based organizations, healthcare 
facilities, and professional associations involved with 
public health preparedness efforts. In fall 2001, DPH 
began meeting with other state agencies, specifically 
the Division of Emergency Management, to discuss 
bioterrorism response planning.
Infrastructure improvements. In 2002, North Carolina 
created the Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response (PHP&R) within DPH. PHP&R coordinates 
all functions of the state response to public health 
emergencies. In turn, PHP&R created seven Public 
Health Regional Surveillance Teams (PHRSTs) to pro-
vide support to local health agencies across the state. 
The PHRST infrastructure was a direct outgrowth of 
the of the zone coordinator system used during the 
Hurricane Floyd response. The PHRST regions overlap 
with state hazardous material, or HAZMAT, regions.
By summer 2003, DPH had hired 34 full-time- 
equivalent staff, including 28 PHRST members, and 
surge capacity staff through the Department of Agri-
culture and Consumer Services (crisis center-affiliated 
veterinarians) and the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources. Twelve new public health epi-
demiologists had also been hired statewide.
During 2002 and 2003, PHP&R created prepared-
ness protocols and updated the state Emergency 
Operations Plan to address bioterrorism events, disease 
outbreaks, and other public health emergencies. A criti-
cal accomplishment was the creation of an Operations 
Plan, which outlines actions and establishes activation 
and coordination procedures to be carried out during 
a public health emergency. Additional infrastructure 
improvements included enhancing Biosafety Level-
3 and Level-2 laboratories, purchasing vehicles and 
equipment, and implementing the emergency depart-
ment database.
Communication. In 2003, PHP&R established a Public 
Health Command Center in Raleigh to serve as a base 
for public health operations during an emergency as an 
extension of the state Emergency Operations Center. 
DPH also established and implemented the Health 
Alert Network for immediate statewide notification of 
public health events.
Training, exercises, and drills. PHRST members and local 
public health staff received training in core public 
health competencies and bioterrorism and emergency 
preparedness competencies. PHP&R conducted state, 
local, and regional drills and exercises, and opened the 
Public Health Command Center twice to coordinate 
responses to public health emergencies, including a 
confirmed case of SARS.
Hurricane Isabel preparation
PHP&R began preparation for Isabel six days prior 
to landfall and intensified preparation efforts in the 
three days before landfall. These activities included 
deploying PHRSTs, opening the Public Health Com-
mand Center, and organizing logistics to implement 
functional capabilities. DPH staff communicated with 
22  Practice Articles
Public Health Reports / January–February 2007 / Volume 122
Emergency Operations Center staff, other state agen-
cies such as Emergency Management and the Depart-
ment of Environmental and Natural Resources, the 
CDC, and UNC SPH faculty to meet surge capacity 
needs. Figure 3 presents a selected, but not exhaus-
tive, list of PHP&R activities three days in advance of 
hurricane landfall.
Hurricane Isabel response
DPH and PHP&R implemented the following func-
tional capabilities to meet public health needs after 
Hurricane Isabel landfall: epidemiology functions, 
including a rapid needs assessment and medical sur-
veillance; communications; and command and control 
infrastructure.
Rapid needs assessment. Prior to Hurricane Isabel’s 
landfall, PHP&R staff and CDC quickly developed a 
rapid needs assessment instrument based on previous 
assessment instruments.18 PHP&R deployed 10 rapid 
needs assessment teams within 36 hours of landfall. 
Data from the rapid needs assessment indicated that 
minimal damage had occurred in the counties initially 
surveyed. Through communications with other coun-
ties, the coastal PHRST team, and data from FEMA 
and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
reports, it became clear that more substantial damage 
had occurred in other areas of the state. Public Health 
Command Center staff and the rapid needs assessment 
teams conducted a conference call to determine the 
next plan of action. The staff consensus was to com-
plete remaining assessments in the initial counties and 
conduct a second round of assessments in counties 
more affected by the hurricane.
DPH and Division of Emergency Management 
personnel considered the data from the rapid needs 
assessment to be very useful in managing response 
Figure 3. Selected North Carolina Division of Public Health, Office of Public Health  
Preparedness and Response Hurricane Isabel preparation activities
Monday, September 15:
— Attended the DPH expanded management team meeting and discussed staffing needs for the Emergency Operations Center. 
— Convened a conference call with local health directors to review projected landfall and communicate response activities.
— Met with federal agencies to prepare for response activities, e.g., rapid needs assessment.
— Organized deployment of PHRST members and communicated plan to PHRST members.
— Met with Emergency Operation Center staff members to coordinate opening of command centers.
— Attended Emergency Operations Center briefings and technical trainings for EM 2000 tracking system.
— Identified public information for PHRST members to distribute in the field. 
Tuesday September 16:
— Opened the Public Health Command Center on 12-hour shifts.
— Attended Emergency Operations Center briefings.
— Organized rapid needs assessment and medical surveillance activities (e.g., protocols, logistics arrangements).
— Coordinated with other state agencies (e.g., Department of Environment and Natural Resources).
— Met with UNC SPH regarding possible response needs.
Wednesday September 17:
— Attended Emergency Operations Center briefings.
— Met with Division of Emergency Management to discuss rapid needs assessment.
— Conducted internal DPH meetings to coordinate response efforts and staffing. 
— Contacted personnel assigned to work in Public Health Command Center.
— Updated public information Web sites and issued press releases.
— PHRST members from western region of the state reported to the Public Health Command Center.
— Coordinated activities of federal personnel within Public Health Command Center.
— Trained PHRST members to conduct rapid needs assessment.
Thursday September 18 (landfall):
— Attended Emergency Operations Center briefings.
— Conducted Public Health Command Center briefings.
— Organized deployment and training of rapid needs assessment teams.
— Communicated with local health departments and local emergency management agencies about rapid needs assessment teams in  
 field.
— Communicated with hospitals about medical surveillance activities.
— Attended federal staff conference call with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
— Conducted rapid needs assessment training for volunteers.
PHRST 5 Public Health Regional Surveillance Team
UNCSPH 5 University of North Carolina School of Public Health
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needs. These were the first objective data to confirm 
that the initial counties surveyed had experienced 
minimal damage, thus allowing DPH and other agen-
cies to redirect the response emphasis to more affected 
counties.
Medical surveillance. DPH surveyed emergency depart-
ments in 33 North Carolina hospitals, two Veterans 
Affairs hospitals, and two referral hospitals to measure 
hurricane-related morbidity and mortality. The network 
of hospitals and systems included in the surveillance 
was based on the Hurricane Floyd surveillance activities, 
and the medical surveillance instrument was updated 
to collect data on injuries.
Communication. The Public Health Command Center 
operations plan was tested and fully functional during 
Hurricane Isabel. All positions were staffed 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week, in three shifts. DPH and PHP&R 
leadership attended daily Emergency Operations Cen-
ter briefings and then provided key information to 
the Public Health Command Center positions during 
daily briefings.
The Public Health Command Center standard 
operating procedures require a list of current contact 
information for all health directors and backup per-
sonnel, including work, home, and pager numbers. 
DPH personnel indicated that the ability to access this 
information quickly facilitated response communica-
tions between Command Center personnel and health 
directors. Communication with citizens occurred pri-
marily through information packets provided directly 
by rapid needs assessment teams.
Study participants were positive about PHP&R’s 
operation of the Public Health Command Center 
and the staff’s ability to meet communication needs. 
For example, PHRST members contacted the Public 
Health Command Center to facilitate local health 
director requests for the Emergency Operations Center 
to relocate the National Guard deployment. Com-
munications were not flawless, as there were delays in 
communication when Public Health Command Center 
or DPH managers could not be reached; nevertheless, 
the Public Health Command Center provided a single 
point of contact for public health needs and a struc-
tured process for tracking and answering questions.
Command and control. Hurricane Isabel allowed 
PHP&R to thoroughly test the Operations Plan by 
implementing and testing protocols and systems. 
Employees in the Public Health Command Center 
managed critical activities, such as the rapid needs 
assessment and medical surveillance, and centralized 
communications with local health directors; they used 
the center as an extension of the State Emergency 
Operations Center. Hurricane Isabel also provided 
a critical opportunity to test command, control, and 
communication functions through the implementation 
of the rapid needs assessment.
DISCUSSION
This evaluation study demonstrated two primary 
findings: first, that DPH used federal bioterrorism 
cooperative agreement funding to implement capac-
ity-building activities and functional capabilities that 
improved public health preparedness planning, prepa-
ration, and response to Hurricane Isabel as compared 
to the preparation and response to Hurricane Floyd. 
Second, that evaluating such activities and capabilities 
within the phases of disasters framework advances our 
understanding of preparedness beyond that obtained 
by methods that do not test capabilities in real-time, 
emergency conditions.
The capacity-building activities11 undertaken after 
Hurricane Floyd resulted in new staff, implementing 
the Health Alert Network and the NC Emergency 
Department Database, enhancing laboratory capacity, 
purchasing equipment, strengthening communica-
tion with other agencies, and providing staff training 
that included exercises and drills. These actions led 
to the demonstration of public health preparedness 
functional capabilities during Hurricane Isabel.11 
Capabilities included effective, centralized communi-
cation through the Public Health Command Center 
and command and control incident management. 
Command and control incident management imple-
ments operational and functional plans and facilitates 
the performance of epidemiology and surveillance 
functions in emergency conditions (Figure 4). These 
capabilities were not present during the Hurricane 
Floyd response.
An important capacity-building activity undertaken 
was the strengthening of communication between 
state agencies, specifically between DPH and the 
State Division of Emergency Management. One per-
son interviewed for this study remarked, “Emergency 
Management considers DPH ‘full players’ and they 
work together throughout the crises and we all solve 
problems together.”
Findings of this study must be considered in light 
of some limitations. First, this project was designed to 
answer specific questions of interest identified by DPH; 
other questions regarding preparedness (e.g., how 
much of DPH’s funds have been expended) were not 
considered. Such questions would be necessary to make 
a clear comparison of evaluation methods (real-time 
vs. hypothetical evaluation of preparedness). Second, 
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DPH provided most documents and identified most 
interview participants, which may have positively biased 
evaluation results. Third, no attempts were made to 
verify document quality or accuracy.
The evaluation design, case studies within a natural 
experiment, was chosen because it is particularly useful 
to understand a situation or phenomenon in depth, 
particularly when cases rich in needed information 
are available.19 Further, information gleaned from the 
cases studied can provide insights into other similar 
situations.20 This design, however, has limited gener-
alizeability and does not control for many threats to 
external validity.
Further improvements in preparedness capabilities
Review of DPH planning, preparation, and response to 
Hurricane Isabel revealed that protocols needed fur-
ther improvement. Recommended protocol improve-
ments included creating formal mechanisms to deploy 
PHRST members, finalizing mechanisms to reimburse 
PHRST members and volunteers for expenses incurred 
while deployed, and implementing a full incident 
command structure during a rapid needs assessment. 
In addition, study participants recommended further 
training for all DPH staff. DPH has addressed many 
of these improvements and continues to improve its 
capacity-building activities and functional capabilities. 
In 2004, DPH and PHP&R implemented a rapid needs 
assessment18 to investigate a Legionnaire’s disease 
outbreak21 and opened the Public Health Command 
Center as part of a Shiga toxin-producing E. coli infec-
tions outbreak investigation.22
A RAND Corporation 2005 study identified the 
DPH PHRST infrastructure as an exemplary practice 
for public health preparedness. PHRSTs act as an 
innovative infrastructure for on-call consulting that 
enhances local outbreak readiness with specific team 
compositions that can be easily replicated. These teams 
build surveillance capacity by coordinating regional epi-
demiologic response activities and providing resources 
to local health departments.23
CDC’s 2005 Cooperative Agreement Guidance 
emphasizes public health system performance param-
eters that require the implementation of capacities 
to achieve standards.24 Exercises and drills have also 
been used to identify gaps in preparedness plans, test 
functional capacities, and strengthen agency and com-
munity relationships partners.11 Such efforts identify 
Figure 4. North Carolina Division of Public Health Preparedness  
capacity-building activities and functional capability improvements
 CAPACITY-BUILDING ACTIVITIES FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES
Effective, centralized communication through Public Health 
Command Center
• Between state agencies
• With local public health departments
• With community and academic partners
• With citizens
Command and Control Incident Management
• Operational and functional plans
• Systematic response
• Decision making in real-time emergency conditions
• Epidemiology and surveillance
 o Rapid needs assessment
 o Medical surveillance
Created infrastructure
• Office of Public Health Preparedness & Response
• Public Health Command Center
• Public Health Regional Surveillance Teams
Employed staff
• Bioterrorism Coordinator
• Office of Public Health Preparedness & Response staff
• Public Health Regional Surveillance Team staff: 28 in  
 Seven regions statewide
• Public health epidemiologists: 12 statewide
Implemented Health Alert Network
Implemented NC Emergency Department Database
Enhanced laboratory capacity
• Biosafety Level 3 and Level 2
Purchased equipment
• Eight vehicles
• Fixed, vehicle-mounted and hand-held radios
Strengthened communication
• Bioterrorism Steering Committee
Provided training
• Emergency preparedness and core public health  
 competencies
• Exercises and drills
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problems in planning and functional capability; 
however, few evaluation studies of outcomes and cost-
effectiveness of this approach have been conducted. 
Moreover, these efforts do not test capacity-building 
activities and functional capabilities in real-time, 
emergency conditions. In this evaluation study, the 
Hurricane Isabel rapid needs assessment revealed 
DPH capacity to make decisions in the field regarding 
the timing and organization of a second rapid needs 
assessment and identified a need for further protocol 
development. An exercise scenario may not identify 
these challenges or fully test command and control 
problem-solving capabilities between field personnel 
and incident commanders. Drills and exercises tend 
to have rote protocols that are not affected by chang-
ing information that occurs in real conditions. When 
possible, a real-time test of preparedness activities and 
capabilities would seem to further our understanding 
more than would simulated activities.
Other health departments have tested capacity-build-
ing activities and functional capabilities in outbreak 
investigations. Learning from Experience examined seven 
state responses to West Nile virus, SARS, monkeypox, 
and hepatitis A outbreaks.11 The Thurston County 
Health Department created a public health incident 
response plan and implemented incident command 
structure to conduct an investigation of HIV/AIDS 
transmission in the community, including triaging 
phone calls from the public and conducting contact 
tracing.25 These types of tests fulfill the current CDC 
Cooperative Agreement Guidance, which calls for data 
from drills and exercises, suggesting that data from real 
events could be one way of demonstrating achievement 
of performance standards.24
Public health systems must be able to respond 
to natural disasters, bioterrorism attacks, emerging 
infectious disease, and other public health emergen-
cies. While these emergencies differ in their response 
requirements, public health systems that invest in a 
variety of capacity-building activities and test functional 
capabilities in real-time, emergency conditions will be 
better able to achieve the preparedness goals to miti-
gate mortality, morbidity, and the social consequences 
of the disaster.11,8 How states perform in real situations 
should be a major focus of evaluating public health 
preparedness. While agencies can create a number 
of plans and protocols through capacity-building 
activities during the planning phase of a public health 
emergency, agencies should be prepared to create just-
in-time policies during the preparation and response 
phases of a public health emergency.
The considerable federal investment in public 
health preparedness capacity has yielded improve-
ments in how state and local agencies achieve federal 
preparedness benchmarks, capacity-building activities, 
and functional capabilities. Yet, this funding occurs 
in cycles that often include periods of considerable 
neglect.26 Public health systems have competing pri-
orities; bioterrorism and emergency preparedness 
are seen as an add-on function that detracts from 
funding for chronic public health challenges such as 
obesity.27 The capacity improvements and functional 
capabilities, however, will support public health systems 
in addressing public health emergencies, including 
avian influenza and natural disasters, which can affect 
much of the population. Future federal funding efforts 
could further improve public health preparedness by 
providing clear requirements for conducting public 
health capacity-building activities and demonstrating 
public health functional capabilities to meet public 
health preparedness objectives and goals.
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